Native data-plane API

The native JSON data-plane API lives at /api/v1/ on the public listener: the same host:port as the S3 API, a different path prefix. No SigV4 signing, no XML. JSON in, JSON out.

It is a new transport and auth layer over the same domain pipeline the S3 handler uses (the same object coordinator, encryption, dedup, checksums, versioning, object-lock, scope enforcement, quota, and audit). A native write is encrypted-at-rest, deduped, quota-checked, and retention-gated exactly like an S3 write.

For most apps, reach this API through a first-party SDK rather than calling it directly: Go, Node, or Java. The SDKs auto-manage the bearer token for you. This page is the wire-level reference.

Authentication

The native API does not use SigV4 on data calls. A caller exchanges its existing S3 access key for a short-lived native bearer token.

Mint a token: `POST /api/v1/auth/token`

OAuth client-credentials style. Present your S3 access-key id plus secret either as HTTP Basic (Authorization: Basic base64(accessKeyId:secretKey)) or a JSON body {"accessKeyId": "...", "secretKey": "..."}. On success you get a short-lived bearer token:

text

lwtk_<base64url(payloadJSON)>.<base64url(HMAC-SHA256(payloadB64, signingKey))>

TTL is security.native_api_token_ttl (default 1h). Keep it short: a leaked token is replayable until it expires.
The token is stateless and signed (HMAC under a per-deployment key derived from the at-rest master key), so the hot path verifies it with no per-request DB lookup for the token itself.
Revoking or expiring the underlying access key (or disabling the tenant) invalidates outstanding tokens promptly. The verify path re-checks revocation on every request, so a token can never outlive or out-scope the key it points at.
This endpoint accepts the secret once, so it must run behind TLS. It is rate-limited per access-key id and audited (success and failure).

Send the token on every subsequent call as Authorization: Bearer <token>. The SDKs cache it until shortly before expiry, refresh transparently, and re-mint once on a 401.

The bearer token is replayable until it expires. Keep its TTL short and always mint it over TLS, since

auth/token accepts the secret in the clear. :::

Signed-URL auth (no bearer token)

GET|PUT /api/v1/signed/{bucket}/{key...}?token=… is authorized solely by the query token: an HMAC-signed, expiring URL token (lwurl_…) minted by POST /api/v1/sign-url, under a separate per-deployment key.

At access time the handler re-checks the underlying key's revocation, re-runs the per-operation scope and bucket-policy gates against the current scope, and enforces that the request method and bucket/key match the signed token. A tampered, expired, wrong-method, wrong-resource, revoked, or scope-exceeding URL is rejected (401/403). See signed URLs.

Routes

All routes except /healthz, /openapi.json, and /auth/token require a valid bearer token. The tenant is taken from the signed token, never the request path, so cross-tenant access is structurally impossible (another tenant's bucket returns 404, never a leak).

Buckets

Method + path	Purpose
`GET /buckets`	list the tenant's buckets
`POST /buckets`	create a private bucket (versioning / object-lock options)
`GET /buckets/{bucket}`	get a bucket
`DELETE /buckets/{bucket}`	delete an empty bucket
`GET\|PUT /buckets/{bucket}/versioning`	read / set versioning state

Objects

Method + path	Purpose
`PUT /buckets/{bucket}/objects/{key...}`	streaming upload
`GET /buckets/{bucket}/objects/{key...}`	streaming download (`Range` supported)
`HEAD /buckets/{bucket}/objects/{key...}`	metadata only
`DELETE /buckets/{bucket}/objects/{key...}`	delete (delete marker in a versioned bucket)
`GET /buckets/{bucket}/objects`	list (`prefix` / `delimiter` / `maxKeys` / `continuationToken`)
`POST /buckets/{bucket}/objects:batchDelete`	batch delete, per-key results
`POST /buckets/{bucket}/object-copy/{key...}`	same-tenant server-side copy

The upload supports several controls:

An Idempotency-Key header, mapped onto the same idempotency store the S3 X-Lockwell-Idempotency-Key path uses.
Native conditional writes (If-Match / If-None-Match).
Optional server-side checksum verification (X-Lockwell-Checksum-<alg> for CRC32, CRC32C, CRC64NVME, SHA1, SHA256). A bad digest is rejected before any bytes are committed.

The copy source is the JSON body ({sourceBucket, sourceKey, sourceVersionId?, metadataDirective?, …, requireAbsent?, requireMatchEtag?}). Cross-tenant copy is impossible, since the source resolves under the token's tenant.

Versions, tags, and per-object WORM

Method + path	Purpose
`GET /buckets/{bucket}/versions`	list versions and delete markers (`prefix` / `keyMarker` / `versionIdMarker`)
`GET\|PUT\|DELETE /buckets/{bucket}/object-tags/{key...}`	get / replace / clear the JSON tag set
`GET\|PUT /buckets/{bucket}/object-retention/{key...}`	per-object retention (`{mode: GOVERNANCE\|COMPLIANCE, retainUntil}`)
`GET\|PUT /buckets/{bucket}/object-legal-hold/{key...}`	legal-hold status (`{status: ON\|OFF}`)

These four sub-resources use a distinct path prefix (not a suffix on /objects/{key...}) so the key wildcard preserves embedded slashes.

Retention can be extended but never shortened. There is no governance bypass on the native path, a deliberate

non-goal that stays closed. :::

Multipart

Method + path	Purpose
`POST /buckets/{bucket}/multipart/{key...}`	create an upload
`PUT /buckets/{bucket}/multipart/{uploadId}/parts/{partNumber}/{key...}`	upload a part
`GET /buckets/{bucket}/multipart/{uploadId}/parts/{key...}`	list parts
`POST /buckets/{bucket}/multipart/{uploadId}/complete/{key...}`	complete
`DELETE /buckets/{bucket}/multipart/{uploadId}/{key...}`	abort
`GET /buckets/{bucket}/multipart`	list in-progress uploads

Signed URLs

Method + path	Purpose
`POST /sign-url` (bearer)	mint a method-, resource-, and scope-bounded signed URL: `{method, bucket, key, ttlSeconds?}`
`GET\|PUT /signed/{bucket}/{key...}?token=…` (no bearer)	use a signed URL

method is GET (download) or PUT (upload): the native API supports signed write URLs. The TTL is clamped to security.max_presign_ttl, and the URL can never exceed the minting key's live scope (a read-only key minting a PUT URL is 403).

Bucket event notifications

Method + path	Purpose
`GET /buckets/{bucket}/notifications`	get the configuration
`PUT /buckets/{bucket}/notifications`	set it (an empty `configs` list clears it)
`DELETE /buckets/{bucket}/notifications`	clear it

Only the webhook target is supported. An sns/sqs/lambda target is 501. The per-config webhook signing secret is generated server-side (crypto/rand, sealed at rest) and is never returned on the wire; the response carries only hasSecret. See webhooks.

Native fields surfaced

Object reads surface Lockwell-native details S3 XML hides: native checksums (CRC32/CRC32C/CRC64NVME/SHA1/SHA256), encryption and compression status, storage class, version id, retention and legal-hold, and content length. They come back as JSON fields and X-Lockwell-* response headers.

Error shape (`problem+json`)

Failures return an application/problem+json body:

json

{
  "code": "not_found",
  "message": "bucket \"reports\" not found",
  "status": 404,
  "requestId": "req_01HXY…"
}

code is a stable machine-readable string. requestId correlates the failure with its server-side audit row (also echoed in the X-Request-Id header). Status mapping:

Status	Meaning
`401`	missing/invalid/expired bearer token, or a revoked access key
`403`	access-key scope or bucket-policy denial
`404`	bucket/key not found
`409`	bucket already exists
`412`	conditional-write or copy-source precondition not met
`501`	unsupported notification target (SNS/SQS/Lambda)
`507`	tenant storage quota exceeded

Security parity

The native API is private by default and never served anonymously. Every control the S3 path enforces is enforced identically here, through the same domain services:

Tenant isolation (from the token, never the path).
Per-operation read/write/delete/admin plus bucket/prefix scope enforcement.
Explicit-deny bucket policies.
Encryption, dedup, quota, object-lock, retention, and legal-hold.
Audit on every request, including denials.

It does not relax any S3 control or enable any public/anonymous access. See tenancy and auth.

OpenAPI

The full machine-readable contract is an OpenAPI 3 document, available two ways:

Served live at GET /api/v1/openapi.json (unauthenticated, since you need the contract before you hold a token).
Committed at internal/nativeapi/openapi.json (the canonical source; the served document is the same bytes).

Each operation carries a unique operationId (putObject, listObjects, signURL, setBucketNotifications, …), so you can generate a client in any language with openapi-generator (make codegen produces TypeScript/Python/Go clients for both the native and admin specs). Prefer the first-party SDKs for Go, Node, and Java; codegen is the path for every other language.

Interactive reference

Every native operation below is generated from that OpenAPI document, so it always matches the shipped server. Expand an operation for its path and query parameters, request and response schemas, and copy-paste curl / fetch samples. The example host is a placeholder; swap in your own deployment.

Native data-plane API ​

Authentication ​

Mint a token: POST /api/v1/auth/token ​

Signed-URL auth (no bearer token) ​

Routes ​

Buckets ​

Objects ​

Versions, tags, and per-object WORM ​

Multipart ​

Signed URLs ​

Bucket event notifications ​

Native fields surfaced ​

Error shape (problem+json) ​

Security parity ​

OpenAPI ​

Interactive reference ​

Lockwell Native Data-Plane API​

Servers​

system​

Operations​

Liveness probe​

Responses​

Playground​

Samples​

This OpenAPI document​

Responses​

Playground​

Samples​

auth​

Operations​

Mint a native bearer token from an S3 access key​

Responses​

Playground​

Samples​

Mint a short-lived, scoped, signed native URL​

Authorizations​

Responses​

Playground​

Samples​

signed​

Operations​

Download via a signed URL (no bearer token)​

Parameters​

Path Parameters

Responses​

Playground​

Samples​

Upload via a signed URL (no bearer token)​

Parameters​

Path Parameters

Responses​

Playground​

Samples​

buckets​

Operations​

List the tenant's buckets​

Authorizations​

Responses​

Playground​

Samples​

Create a private bucket​

Authorizations​

Responses​

Playground​

Samples​

Get a bucket​

Authorizations​

Parameters​

Path Parameters

Responses​

Playground​

Samples​

Delete a bucket​

Authorizations​

Parameters​

Path Parameters

Responses​

Playground​

Samples​

Get bucket versioning state​

Native data-plane API

Authentication

Mint a token: `POST /api/v1/auth/token`

Signed-URL auth (no bearer token)

Routes

Buckets

Objects

Versions, tags, and per-object WORM

Multipart

Signed URLs

Bucket event notifications

Native fields surfaced

Error shape (`problem+json`)

Security parity

OpenAPI

Interactive reference

Lockwell Native Data-Plane API

Servers

system

Operations

Liveness probe

Responses

Playground

Samples

This OpenAPI document

Responses

Playground

Samples

auth

Operations

Mint a native bearer token from an S3 access key

Responses

Playground

Samples

Mint a short-lived, scoped, signed native URL

Authorizations

Responses

Playground

Samples

signed

Operations

Download via a signed URL (no bearer token)

Parameters

Responses

Playground

Samples

Upload via a signed URL (no bearer token)

Parameters

Responses

Playground

Samples

buckets

Operations

List the tenant's buckets

Authorizations

Responses

Playground

Samples

Create a private bucket

Authorizations

Responses

Playground

Samples

Get a bucket

Authorizations

Parameters

Responses

Playground

Samples

Delete a bucket

Authorizations

Parameters

Responses

Playground

Samples

Get bucket versioning state

Authorizations

Parameters

Responses

Playground